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THE RELEASE-DISMISSAL AGREEMENT: AN IMPERFECT
INSTRUMENT OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
On the night of January 12, 1989, police officers in Washington
Township, Pennsylvania, responded to a domestic violence call at the
Livingstone residence.' A scuffle ensued between the police and Mrs.
Livingstone, and she was subsequently charged with several criminal
offenses including aggravated assault.2 Mrs. Livingstone claimed that the
police struck her, applied a stun gun between her legs in the vulval area,
dragged her out of the house, banged her head on the ground several times,
and dropped her into a muddy puddle of water.3 The police officers, on the
other hand, claimed that they used only "necessary" force to control Mrs.
Livingstone.' These conflicting claims were not resolved at trial. Instead,
the prosecutor negotiated a deal whereby the state dropped the criminal
charges against Mrs. Livingstone in exchange for her promise not to
proceed with civil actions against the police officers or the municipality.5
The above account demonstrates the use of a tool known as a
release-dismissal agreement. Release-dismissal agreements are settlements
in which a prosecutor promises to drop criminal charges in exchange for
a defendant's agreement to drop civil claims against the police, municipali-
ty, or state.6 As suggested by the preceding example, these agreements
1. The following facts are taken from Livingstone v. North Belle Vernon Borough, 12 F.3d 1205
(3d Cir. 1993).
2. Id. at 1207-08. Mrs. Livingstone was initially charged with disorderly conduct, aggravated
assault, terroristic threats, resisting arrest, and interference with custody. Id. at 1207.
3. Id. at 1206-07.
4. Id. at 1207.
5. Id. at 1208.
6. Criminal defendants who enter into release-dismissal agreements often agree to waive their
civil claims against the police, municipality, or state arising under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983
provides as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State
or Territory or The District of Columbia, subjects ... any citizen of the United States ... to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured ....
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
This Note only examines the traditional preconviction release-dismissal agreement and does not
address variations on the traditional form. For examples of other forms of agreement, see Vallone v.
Lee, 7 F.3d 196 (11th Cir. 1993) (dealing with agreement of criminal defendant to release police
officials from civil liability in exchange for pretrial release from jail); Jones v. Taber, 648 F.2d 1201
(9th Cir. 1981) (discussing agreement of state/municipality to pay monetary compensation for injuries
in exchange for defendant's promise to drop civil suit); Berry v. Peterson, 887 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1989)
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harbor enormous potential for abuse. The agreements essentially allow
police departments, municipalities, and states the opportunity to absolve
themselves of accountability in cases of misconduct. Because of this
potential for abuse, release-dismissal agreements have been the subject of
controversy and recent litigation.
This Note weighs the interests of the criminal defendant, the state, and
the public to determine the wisdom of enforcing release-dismissal
agreements. First, this Note argues that the agreements provide mutual
benefits for both the criminal defendant and the state in a narrow set of
circumstances. Existing court decisions have focused on preserving the
rights of criminal defendants and upholding the interests of the state.
However, this Note argues that release-dismissal agreements, by their
failure to address police misconduct, can expose the public to danger.
Although judicial solutions protect the interests of the criminal defendant
and the state, courts have failed to remove the risk of continued police
misconduct which the public still bears. Ultimately, this Note concludes
that release-dismissal agreements have considerable merit, but proposes that
they must not be enforced unless the public is adequately protected from
potential abuses. In order to achieve this protection, state legislatures should
implement civilian oversight committees as a means of retaining the
benefits of release-dismissal agreements while ensuring independent review
of alleged police misconduct.
Part I provides a history of release-dismissal agreements and discusses
how they have been received by courts. Part II examines judicial decisions
concerning release-dismissal agreements and proposes a model judicial
framework that preserves benefits for both the criminal defendant and the
state. Part III identifies unresolved problems with judicial solutions that
expose the public to danger. Finally, Part IV proposes state legislation to
establish civilian oversight committees designed to protect the public from
potential abuses. These oversight committees would publicly reveal and
remedy police misconduct that might otherwise be buried by a
release-dismissal agreement. The committees would also deter future police
misconduct.
(enforcing preconviction probation agreement used to secure defendant's promise not to pursue a civil
suit); Bushnell v. Rossetti, 750 F.2d 298 (4th Cir. 1984) (regarding postconviction release-dismissal
agreements).
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I. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF RELEASE-DISMISSAL AGREEMENTS
In the initial cases regarding the validity of release-dismissal agreements,
courts focused their attention on three factors: the criminal defendant's
rights; the state's interests; and the public's right to be informed of police
misconduct. Over time, however, courts have narrowed their focus to the
first two of these factors and have neglected to address the public's interest
in receiving notice of police misconduct.
A. Pre-1987 Cases
Prior to 1987, federal courts generally held that release-dismissal
agreements were per se impermissible and devoid of any benefits to justify
their use.7 Dixon v. District of Columbia8 represents a typical pre-1987
case. In Dixon, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia held that release-dismissal agreements are invalid, and character-
ized the agreement at issue as "odious" and contrary to public policy per
se.9 The prosecutor and Dixon had allegedly entered into a "tacit"
agreement, whereby the prosecutor would not prosecute traffic charges
pending against Dixon in exchange for Dixon's promise to drop any civil
7. See, e.g., MacDonald v. Musick, 425 F.2d 373, 375-76 (9th Cir. 1970) (analogizing a
prosecutor's actions in seeking release-dismissal agreement to extortion), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852
(1970); Boyd v. Adams, 513 F.2d 83, 89 (7th Cir. 1975) (holding agreement "invalid as a matter of
public policy"); Home v. Pane, 514 F. Supp 551, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding that "[criminal
defendants] cannot as a matter of law make an uncoerced choice" about whether to enter into release-
dismissal agreements).
However, a few courts found that release-dismissal agreements did not violate public policy per se.
See, e.g., Bushnell, 750 F.2d at 301. The Bushnell court distinguished the case from other cases in
which courts had held the agreements to be invalid. Id. at 30 1. The court reasoned that because the case
involved a postconviction release-dismissal agreement, it did not carry the same public policy concerns
found in preconviction release-dismissal agreements. Id. In Bushnell, the plaintiff agreed to drop the
civil suit in exchange for the state's recommendation of probation. Id. at 299. However, in typical
release-dismissal agreements, a prosecutor attempts to make a deal before trial or even before seeking
an indictment, and offers to drop criminal charges entirely in exchange for the criminal defendant's
promise to drop civil § 1983 claims.
See also Hoines v. Barney's Club, 620 P.2d 628, 634 (Cal. 1980) (concluding that release-dismissal
agreements are a legitimate exercise of prosecutorial power similar to plea bargaining); Food Fair
Stores, Inc. v. Joy, 389 A.2d 874, 881 (Md. 1978) (stating that "[invalidating agreements per se would]
place an unwarranted constraint upon the prosecutor, who might... wish to extend a compassionate
hand to a first time offender").
8. 394 F.2d 966 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
9. Id. at 969.
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claims.'" Three months later, Dixon decided to press civil claims; in
response, the prosecutor decided to pursue the traffic violations." At trial,
the judge granted a series of continuances to the prosecutor and later
directed findings of not guilty after the prosecutor insisted on entering a
nolle prosequi in order to preserve the right to prosecute at a later date . 2
On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed and found
that the prosecutor had discretion to nolle prosequi the case. 3
On further appeal, the D.C. Circuit vacated the lower court's decision
and concluded that the prosecutor should not have even proceeded to trial
because the release-dismissal agreement was illegal per se.' 4 First, and
most importantly, the court concluded that these agreements "suppress
complaints against police misconduct which should be thoroughly aired in
a free society."'5 Second, the court expressed concern that allowing these
agreements might tempt prosecutors to "trump up charges" to use as
10. Id. at 968. The police stopped the petitioner for traffic violations but did not ticket him at the
time. Id. After the petitioner submitted a written complaint to the police department regarding the
officers' actions, the prosecutor offered the release-dismissal agreement. Id. Apparently, the prosecutor
acted in defiance of a 1964 directive from the D.C. Board of Commissioners, which specifically
prohibited prosecutors from using release-dismissal agreements as a precondition to dropping criminal
charges. The directive also prohibited prosecutors from exercising a nolle prosequi in order to protect
the police from liability. Id. at 969.
11. 394 F.2d at 968. The Chief of the Law Enforcement Division of the Corporation Counsel
stated:
[E]verybody was happy to forget the whole thing .... But three months later he comes in
and makes a formal complaint. So we said "If you are going to play ball like that why
shouldn't we proceed with our case?". .. I had no reason to file until he changed back on
... what we had all agreed on.
Id.
12. Id. at 967. A nolle prosequi is a formal entry by a prosecutor declaring that he "will no further
prosecute" the case. BLACK'S LAW DICIoNARY 1048 (6th ed. 1990). In Dixon, the prosecutor chose
to enter a nolle prosequi after the judge refused to grant a continuance based on the absence of the
prosecution's main witness. 394 F.2d at 967.
13. 394 F.2d at 967-68. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals concluded that Dixon did not
make the requisite showing that the nolle prosequi was exercised in a "scandalous or corrupt manner"
nor in a "capricious and vexatiously repetitious [manner]." Id. However, that court did not address the
concern that charges were improperly brought in the first place. Id.
14. Id. at 969. The court could have concluded that the prosecutor originally had no interest in
prosecuting the case and later decided to prosecute only in retaliation for Dixon's broken promise not
to sue. However, the court explicitly rejected this theory as "naive." Id. Rather, the court argued that
the prosecutor's original decision not to prosecute was made independently of the merits of the case,
and was based solely on a desire to protect the police officers. The court further contended that the
prosecutor probably should have prosecuted in the first place, but declined to do so in the interests of
negotiating a deal to protect the police from liability. Id.
15. Id.
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bargaining chips in coercing criminal defendants to drop their civil suits.,6
Third, the court saw "major evil" in allowing culpable criminal defendants
to avoid legitimate prosecution.'
7
B. Town of Newton v. Rumery
The position taken by the Dixon court maintained general acceptance in
the federal courts 8 until the Supreme Court's 1987 decision in Town of
Newton v. Rumery. 9 In Rumery, a plurality of the Court departed from
prior decisions by limiting its examination to two factors, the criminal
defendant's rights and the state's interests, and neglecting to address the
public's right to obtain notice of police misconduct. The Rumery plurality
concluded that release-dismissal agreements are not impermissible per se,
but should be examined on a case-by-case basis to determine their
validity.2" Justice Powell, writing for the plurality, identified three relevant
issues to consider in each case: the voluntariness of the criminal
defendant's decision to enter the agreement; the public policy interests
being served; and the potential for prosecutorial misconduct or overreach-
ing.
21
16. Id. The court added that the temptation to trump up charges is especially strong, because civil
complaints against the police are usually connected with "extremely vague" criminal charges, such as
disorderly conduct or resisting arrest. Id. The court implied that the vagueness of the charges would
make it easy for police officers to charge a criminal defendant falsely based on little evidence. Id.
17. Id.
18. See supra note 7.
19. 480 U.S. 386 (1987). Bernard Rumery learned that his friend had been indicted for sexual
assault. Rumery called a mutual acquaintance, who happened to be the victim, to obtain more
information. Id. at 389. The victim later called the police, alleging that Rumery put pressure on her to
drop the charges against his friend. Subsequently, police arrested Rumery and charged him with witness
tampering. Id. at 389-90. Rumery's attorney successfully negotiated with the prosecutor to obtain a
release-dismissal agreement. Ten months after signing the agreement, Rumery filed a suit against the
town and police officers for false arrest, defamation, and false imprisonment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
480 U.S. at 391. The trial court dismissed the suit, finding that the release-dismissal agreement
precluded Rumery from filing a civil suit. Id. The trial court also found that the agreement was
voluntarily entered into and did not violate public policy. Id. On appeal, the First Circuit reversed,
holding that release-dismissal agreements violate public policy per se. Id.
20. Id. at 393. The plurality did concede that, in some cases, the "risk, publicity, and expense" of
a trial might overwhelm criminal defendants into seeking a settlement even if they believe they have
a good defense. Id.
21. Id. at 393-98. Furthermore, the plurality explicitly reserved opinion on whether a finding of
voluntariness could by itself sufficiently validate a particular release-dismissal agreement. Id. at 398
n.10. Recent decisions have required the state to show more than voluntariness. See Lynch v. City of
Alhambra, 880 F.2d 1122, 1126-27 (9th Cir. 1989) (requiring voluntariness and no violation of public
policy); Woods v. Rhodes, 994 F.2d 494, 499-501 (8th Cir. 1993) (requiring voluntariness, no
prosecutorial misconduct, and no violation of public policy); Coughlen v. Coots, 5 F.3d 970, 974 (6th
Washington University Open Scholarship
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On the question of voluntariness, the Rumery plurality rejected the notion
that release-dismissal agreements are inherently coercive.2" Citing the plea
bargain process as an example, Justice Powell noted that release-dismissal
agreements do not represent the sole context in which criminal defendants
must make the difficult decision whether to waive their constitutional
rights.' Justice Powell listed four factors to be considered in determining
voluntariness: the defendant's sophistication; the defendant's jail status; the
adequacy of the defendant's legal representation; and the amount of time
the defendant had to consider the decision.24 Applying these criteria, the
plurality characterized Rumery as a "sophisticated businessman."2'5
Rumery was not in jail when he signed the agreement.26 Further, Rumery
had obtained "experienced" legal representation prior to signing the
agreement, and his counsel drafted the agreement.27 Finally, Rumery had
three days to weigh the benefits and drawbacks of signing the agree-
ment. 2' Based on the four criteria, the plurality found that Rumery made
a rational decision to accept the tangible benefits of avoiding a criminal
trial and possible conviction in exchange for giving up the "speculative
benefits" of pursuing a civil § 1983 suit.29
The plurality also examined the public policy interests served by release-
dismissal agreements." Justice Powell conceded that, in some cases,
Cir. 1993) (same); Hill v. City of Cleveland, 12 F.3d 575, 578 (6th Cir. 1993) (same); Cain v. Darby
Borough, 7 F.3d 377, 381 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that "mere voluntariness is not enough to support
enforcement of a release-dismissal agreement"), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1303 (1994).
22. Rumery, 480 U.S. at 393.
23. Id. The plurality in Rumery emphasized that it did not equate release-dismissal agreements with
plea bargaining and further noted some of the shortcomings of the analogy. Id. at 393 n.3. The Court
apparently used plea bargaining merely as an illustration of an acceptable situation in which a criminal
defendant waives constitutional rights. Id. at 393. In response, the dissent argued that the dissimilarities
with plea bargaining indicate that release-dismissal agreements are inherently coercive. Id. at 409-I1.
Post-Rumery cases demonstrate that the differences between plea bargaining and release-dismissal
agreements are not as extreme as the Rumery dissent claims. See infra notes 87-88 and accompanying
text. Some commentators have also argued that plea bargaining is a poor analogy. See, e.g., Erin P.
Bartholomy, An Ethical Analysis of the Release-Dismissal Agreement, 7 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
PUB. POL'Y 331, 351-52 (1993); Brian L. Fielkow, 42 U.S.C. § 1983-Buying Justice: The Role of
Release-Dismissal Agreements in the Criminal Justice System, 78 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1119,
1136 (characterizing the Rumery court's plea bargaining analogy as "superficial").
24. Rumery, 480 U.S. at 394.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 395-96.
[VOL. 72:1769
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release-dismissal agreements do not serve the public interest.' However,
he argued that, in other cases, release-dismissal agreements serve a
beneficial public policy goal and benefit the state by settling "many...
marginal and some... frivolous" § 1983 suits. 32 Justice Powell argued
that by eliminating these borderline § 1983 suits, which often force the
government to devote critical resources to defend itself in protracted
litigation,33 release-dismissal agreements serve the state's policy goals.34
Unfortunately, Justice Powell declined to give much weight to concerns that
the agreements frustrate the public's right to be notified of police
misconduct.35
Lastly, the plurality argued that a rule making release-dismissal
agreements per se illegal unfairly presumes that prosecutors will always
misuse this power.36 Rather than assuming that prosecutors will "trump up
charges," Justice Powell contended that "tradition and experience"
demonstrate that the majority of prosecutors will not succumb to this
temptation and will instead perform their duties with proper discretion.37
Justice Powell added that release-dismissal agreements allow the state to
avoid prosecution of minor criminal charges and, instead, to devote
valuable resources to the prosecution of more serious criminal charges.3"
Because prosecutors are in the best position to evaluate both the merits of
a case and the state's ability to pursue the case, Justice Powell concluded
that courts should give deference to prosecutors' decisions about when to
31. 480 U.S. at 395. Justice Powell agreed with the First Circuit that release-dismissal agreements
may sometimes be the product of trumped-up charges or suppression of police wrongdoing. Id.
However, Powell argued that a blanket ban on such agreements "fails to credit other relevant public
interests and improperly assumes prosecutorial misconduct." Id.
32. Id. The plurality pointed out the settlement of "marginal" suits as one legitimate public policy
goal, but did not indicate any other acceptable public policy justifications for the agreement.
33. Id. at 395-96. Powell listed many resources that would be wasted in the defense of a marginal
civil suit. Legal counsel would be needed for both the official and the municipality/state. Id. at 395.
Attorneys would be burdened by the time to prepare and actually litigate the case at trial, which may
last for several years. Id. at 395-96. Finally, Powell argued that the time spent to prepare and litigate
the case would force public officials to neglect other important public responsibilities. Id. at 395.
34. Id. at 396. The plurality's justification for the agreement rests largely on how the agreement
accommodates the civil rights plaintiff. Id. at 395. Justice Powell also concluded that the government
should be able to accommodate Rumery, who had no public duty to pursue § 1983 litigation and prove
police misconduct. Id.
35. 480 U.S. at 395.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 396-97. Justice Powell also pointed out that courts generally recognize the prosecutor's
right to broad discretion in deciding whether to prosecute or drop charges. Id. (citing Wayte v. United
States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985)).
38. 480 U.S. at 396.
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prosecute.39 Applying this deferential standard to the facts of the case, the
plurality found no evidence of prosecutorial overreaching.40
Justice O'Connor concurred in the result reached by the plurality, but she
wrote separately to stress that the party seeking to enforce the
release-dismissal agreement bears the burden of proving its validity.4
Even Justice Stevens, in his dissent, declined to label release-dismissal
agreements as impermissible per se.4' However, Justice Stevens strongly
39. Id.
40. Id. Besides voluntariness, consistency with public policy, and the absence of prosecutorial
misconduct, Justice Powell identified protection of a witness as an independent reason to uphold the
agreement. Id. at 398. Powell indicated that the prosecutor in Rumery had a right to protect the witness
from the burden of testifying in both Rumery's criminal trial and the civil suit against the police. Powell
concluded that the prosecutor correctly spared the witness from the "public scrutiny and embarrass-
ment." Id.
41. 480 U.S. at 399 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In the plurality opinion, Justice Powell did not
explicitly state that the party seeking enforcement of the agreement had the burden of proving the
agreement's validity.
Justice O'Connor reiterated several factors of the plurality's test of voluntariness, including the
sophistication of the criminal defendant and whether the criminal defendant had legal counsel. Id. at
401-02. Justice O'Connor also identified the seriousness of the criminal charges as another factor to
consider;, she argued that, as the charges and corresponding potential punishment become more serious,
a criminal defendant will more likely feel coerced into opting for a release-dismissal agreement instead
of risking a trial conviction. Id. at 401. Because Rumery faced a light punishment, Justice O'Connor
concluded that the potential coerciveness of the agreement was lessened. Id. at 402. Although Rumery's
witness tampering charge was a serious offense, carrying a maximum seven-year jail term, Justice
O'Connor argued that a long prison sentence was "unlikely" in his case. Id. Rumery was charged with
"one of the lesser felonies" under state law; he had no criminal record; and, the state had a weak case.
Id.
Addressing public policy concerns, O'Connor reiterated the plurality's argument that
release-dismissal agreements save the local community the expense of defending civil cases of
questionable merit. Id. at 399-400 (O'Connor, J., concurring). She argued that the "inconvenience and
distraction" caused by marginal suits are "not inconsiderable," and that the expense of prosecuting
minor crimes would not be justifiable. Id.
Justice O'Connor recognized the benefits of release-dismissal agreements, but took a more cautious
view than the plurality by listing potential problems associated with the agreements. Most importantly,
she argued that prosecutors do consider problems associated with a related civil suit in deciding the
separate question of whether to bring criminal charges. Id. at 401. A release-dismissal agreement,
O'Connor noted, may tempt prosecutors to pursue meritless criminal charges and later bargain them
away in exchange for the dropping of a civil suit. Id. at 400. In addition, O'Connor observed that
prosecutors may violate their duty to the public by dropping legitimate criminal charges in exchange
for a release from civil liability. Id. She suggested judicial oversight as a way to ensure that these
agreements are entered into wisely. Id. at 401-02. Nevertheless, O'Connor found that the facts of
Rumery indicated that the agreement was entered into voluntarily and in the public interest. Id. at 403.
Justice O'Connor also agreed with the plurality that protection of the witness provided an independent
justification for entering into the agreement. Id. at 399.
42. 480 U.S. at 417-18 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun joined
Justice Stevens in dissent.
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disagreed with the plurality's application of the identified factors.43
Initially, Justice Stevens asserted that because release-dismissal
agreements are inherently coercive they can never be truly voluntary."
Justice Stevens argued that these agreements differ from plea bargaining,
in which the state and defendant mutually benefit from the settlement.'
In plea bargaining, the state conserves resources by avoiding the time and
expense of a criminal trial, but still obtains punishment of the admitted
wrongdoer. The criminal defendant benefits by avoiding the risk of a trial
conviction carrying a greater punishment. 6 In release-dismissal agree-
ments, however, the dissent found no mutual advantages for the state and
the criminal defendant. Justice Stevens conceded that the state may save
money by avoiding the criminal trial, but he insisted that the state does not
obtain punishment for the defendants' wrongdoing.47 Justice Stevens also
contended that the prosecution's willingness to deal indicates that the state
might have lacked probable cause. Therefore, the defendant does not
receive any real benefit from the release-dismissal agreement a4 and is in
fact disadvantaged, because he has waived any right to pursue civil
litigation against the police, the municipality, and the state.49 Moreover,
Justice Stevens found this particular release-dismissal agreement to be
inherently coercive. Justice Stevens stated that the agreement "exact[ed] a
price unrelated to the ... defendant's own conduct," because it forced the
defendant to give up a civil claim that was unrelated to the criminal
charge."0
43. Justice Stevens declared the agreement invalid because he found a lack of voluntariness,
conflict with public policy goals, and prosecutorial misconduct. 480 U.S. at 417-18 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
44. Id. at 411. Justice Stevens stressed that a person could make a voluntary and rational decision;
yet, such decisions should not be enforced when circumstances make them inherently coercive. Id. at
408. Stevens compared the situation to one in which a person pays $20 to a state trooper to avoid a
speeding ticket. Id. The decision to pay the police officer is a rational decision, because the person
avoids the ticket. However, Stevens argued that such a situation would be inherently coercive. Id.
45. Id. at 409-10.
46. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
47. Id. at 410.
48. Id. Justice Stevens noted that the prosecutor in Rumery had knowledge that the witness did
not want to testify against Rumery in the witness tampering case. Id. at 410 n. 11. Therefore, Stevens
argued, the state did not plan on prosecuting Rumery anyway. Id.
49. The dissent argues that the release-dismissal agreement does not accomplish anything except
to "resolv[e] once and for all the question of § 1983 liability." Id.
50. 480 U.S. at 411 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens compared a hypothetical situation in
which the defendant gives up a valid civil claim worth $1,000 in exchange for dismissal of an unrelated
criminal charge. Id. The state saves $1,000 it does not have to pay to the criminal defendant. From the
17771994]
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The dissent also argued that release-dismissal agreements undermine
public policy goals by negating the congressional purpose of § 1983.
Justice Stevens asserted that Congress intended to provide redress to the
individual and the public for violations of constitutional rights.5 Accord-
ing to Stevens, release-dismissal agreements undermine this purpose by
denying potential plaintiffs the right to litigate and seek a remedy. He
concluded that the need to provide a remedy should not be defeated by
concern over the costs of defending frivolous civil claims.52 Additionally,
Justice Stevens contended that release-dismissal agreements eliminate
§ 1983 claims prematurely based on assumptions about the "marginal" or
"frivolous" nature of the claim, rather than properly testing the claims in
court.53
Finally, the dissent expressed the belief that prosecutorial misconduct
occurs each time a prosecutor enters into a release-dismissal agreement.54
Justice Stevens asserted that the agreement creates an inherent conflict of
interest for the prosecutor by permitting the prosecutor to put the
government's interest in avoiding liability above the public's interest in
ensuring full prosecution of crimes.55 Justice Stevens argued that a
prosecutor should base his or her decisions solely on the merits of the
criminal case.56 Furthermore, the dissent claimed that a prosecutor might
enter into an agreement simply because the criminal case lacks merit, rather
than dropping the charges as is ethically required.5
criminal defendant's perspective, he or she in effect pays $1,000 to a "police department's retirement
benefit fund." Id. Commentators have interpreted Justice Stevens' hypothetical as a criticism that
release-dismissal agreements, unlike plea bargaining, do not reflect the defendant's true bargaining
position. See infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
51. 480 U.S. at 418-19 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens criticized the plurality for
preventing the criminal defendant from having his case heard by an impartial body. Id. ("[T]he merits
of such claims [should be] resolved openly by an impartial adjudicator rather than sub silentio by a
prosecutor."). He added that prosecutors will not properly resolve civil claims because prosecutors do
not want to "ensure that all meritorious § 1983 claims prevail." Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. The dissent's argument about testing § 1983 claims in court precedes the main discussion
about § 1983's purpose. However, it seems directly applicable to the later points because Stevens' main
public policy argument is that an impartial body rather than the inherently biased prosecutor should be
the party to resolve civil suits. See supra note 51.
54. 480 U.S. at 412 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 412-13.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 413-414. Justice Stevens cited several sources to justify his position. First, Stevens cited
the MODEL RuLs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 3.8(a) (1984), which states, "[prosecutors] shall:
refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause." 480
U.S. at 413. Stevens also cited the MODEL COD OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 7-103 (1980),
[VOL. 72:1769
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II. APPLICATION OF RUMERY IN THE LOWER COURTS
Rumery and its progeny have demonstrated that release-dismissal
agreements can benefit both the state and the individual criminal defendant.
Courts have adequately protected these dual benefits by upholding the
agreements only in a narrow set of circumstances. In the aftermath of
Rumery, several circuit courts have begun to refine the acceptable
conditions under which they will allow the enforcement of release-dismissal
agreements. In particular, the Third and Sixth Circuits have established
model judicial rationales for other courts to emulate. However, the circuit
courts have consistently limited their analysis to the three controlling issues
outlined in Rumery: voluntariness, public policy, and prosecutorial
misconduct.58 Judicial decisions continue to neglect the public's interest
in receiving notice of police misconduct.
A. A Model Test for Voluntariness-The Third Circuit
The Third Circuit issued two en banc opinions in 1993 that examined
remaining questions regarding the voluntariness of release-dismissal
agreements. In Livingstone v. North Belle Borough, 9 the circuit court
formulated a model test for voluntariness that the Rumery plurality did not
provide. Furthermore, in Cain v. Darby Borough,' the court clarified the
importance of voluntariness relative to the other Rumery issues.
which states: "A public prosecutor or other government lawyer shall not institute or cause to be
instituted criminal charges when he knows or it is obvious that the charges are not supported by
probable cause." 480 U.S. at 413 n.16. Moreover, Stevens pointed to the MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-14, which states: "A government lawyer who has discretionary
power relative to litigation should refrain from instituting or continuing litigation that is obviously
unfair." 480 U.S. at 413 n.16.
Stevens found further justification in the ABA STANDARDS FOR CRUMINAL JUSTICE § 3-3.9(a) (2d
ed. 1980), which states: "It is unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor to institute, or cause to be
instituted, or to permit the continued pendency of criminal charges when it is known that the charges
are not supported by probable cause." 480 U.S. at 413 n.16. Finally, the dissent cited the MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 5, which states: "A lawyer should exercise independent
professional judgment on behalf of a client." 480 U.S. at 413 n.16.
Justice Stevens also argued that protection of a witness did not constitute a legitimate justification
for the prosecutor. Id. at 414-15. Rather, Justice Stevens argued that the prosecutor violated his ethical
duty by protecting the witness. Id. at 415. Stevens insisted that although a prosecutor's duties will often
"diverge" from the interests of a witness, a prosecutor must attempt to obtain testimony from a reluctant
witness when successful prosecution of a case requires such testimony. Id.
58. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
59. 12 F.3d 1205 (3d Cir. 1993).
60. 7 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1303 (1994).
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The Livingstone court's test for voluntariness takes into account the
criteria established in Rumery and, at the same time, evaluates the language
and the form of the agreement itself. Adopting the rationale of Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion in Rumery, the Third Circuit placed the
burden on the prosecution to prove the overall validity of any release-
dismissal agreement. 61  This approach wisely protects the criminal
defendant from the potential coerciveness of a release-dismissal agree-
ment.62
In Livingstone, the court determined that the prosecution failed to meet
its burden of proving voluntariness. 63 The Third Circuit properly took into
account the Rumery Court's specific criteria for gauging voluntariness: the
criminal defendant's sophistication, whether the agreement was signed in
jail, the nature of the defendant's representation, and the time provided for
the defendant to deliberate.6' The court noted, in particular, that the
criminal defendant in Livingstone only had ten minutes to decide whether
to agree to the waiver; in Rumery, the defendant enjoyed a three-day
deliberation period.65
In addition to considering the specific Rumery criteria, the Third Circuit
went a step further by carefully evaluating both the language and form (oral
or written) of the agreement. The Livingstone court pointed out that the
release-dismissal agreement in that case did not clearly specify that the
criminal defendant was waiving any future right to sue the police or the
state.66 Instead, the ambiguous wording of the agreement may have led the
61. Livingstone, 12 F.3d at 1211. See also Lynch v. City of Alhambra, 880 F.2d 1122, 1128 (9th
Cir. 1989); Coughlen v. Coots, 5 F.3d 970, 974 (6th Cir. 1993); Hill v. City of Cleveland, 12 F.3d 575,
578 (6th Cir. 1993). But see Woods v. Rhodes, 994 F.2d 494, 499 (8th Cir. 1993), wherein the court
did not expressly place the burden on the state.
62. The allocation of the burden to the state not only provides a check on the potential
coerciveness of the agreement, but also places a check on courts that might be too anxious to enforce
the agreement. For example, in Coughlen, the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's decision because
the lower court treated the agreement as "presumptively valid." 5 F.3d at 974. In doing so, the Sixth
Circuit advocated Justice O'Connor's position that the burden should fall on the party seeking
enforcement of the agreement. Id.
63. Livingstone, 12 F.3d at 1213.
64. Id. at 1210-11. See also supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
65. 12 F.3d at 1214.
66. Id. at 1211-12. The Third Circuit pointed out that neither the judge nor the prosecutor ever
informed Mrs. Livingstone that the oral agreement was a "settlement" by which she agreed to waive
civil claims. Id. at 1214. Also, no party ever explained to Mrs. Livingstone what "full and complete
release" actually meant. Id. Therefore, the Third Circuit characterized the agreement as "patent[ly]
ambiguous." Id. at 1213.
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defendant to believe that she retained her right to pursue litigation.67
Moreover, the prosecution in Livingstone never put the terms of the
agreement in writing.6" Although the Third Circuit did not reject oral
release-dismissal agreements per se, it reasoned that an oral agreement
should be reviewed more strictly by the court.69 The court additionally
noted a "pronounced" contrast between the circumstances surrounding the
agreement in Livingstone and those present in Rumery.7" Applying its
67. 12 F.3d at 1214.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 1212. The court listed several advantages that written agreements have over oral
agreements. First, written agreements provide more "opportunity for deliberate reflection." Id. Second,
written agreements create a more cooperative atmosphere where parties feel more freedom to "propose
modifications to the agreements." Id. at 1213. Finally, a written agreement provides a record to indicate
each party's bargaining power. Id.
The Third Circuit pointed out that neither Rumery nor any other case following Rumery has even
considered enforcing an oral release-dismissal agreement. Livingstone, 12 F.3d at 1213. Additionally,
the Third Circuit noted that the Rumery plurality "never mentioned the possibility of an oral
release-dismissal agreement." Id. Finally, the Third Circuit stated that Justice Stevens in his dissent
assumed the agreement would be written, as evidenced by Stevens' statement: "A court may enforce
such an agreement only after a careful inquiry into the circumstances under which the plaintiff signed
the agreement." Id. (quoting Rumery, 480 U.S. at 417 n.22 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
70. Livingstone, 12 F.3d at 1214. Although the Livingstone court invalidated the agreement largely
on the ambiguity of the oral agreement, it did consider other factors, such as whether the criminal
defendant signed the agreement in jail and whether the defendant's attorney drafted the agreement Id.
at 1210 (citing Woods, 994 F.2d at 499). Livingstone is a rare case in which voluntariness hinged
largely on the terms and form of the agreement. In other cases, courts have dealt with factors other than
the actual terms and form of the agreement.
In Lynch v. City of Alhambra, for example, the Ninth Circuit found the agreement to be voluntary
for several reasons. 880 F.2d at 1127. First, Lynch, the criminal defendant, was "familiar with the
criminal process" because he was a peace officer who served for several years as a Los Angeles County
Marshal. Second, he was represented by legal counsel. Third, Lynch's attorney drafted the agreement.
Fourth, Lynch was not in jail when he signed the agreement. Fifth, Lynch had four weeks to consider
the agreement before deciding to sign the document. Id.
In Woods v. Rhodes, the Eighth Circuit also found the release-dismissal agreement to be voluntary.
994 F.2d at 500. The court concluded that Woods, the criminal defendant, offered no proof of coercion
or ignorance of the terms set out in the agreement. Id. Woods was represented by an attorney. Woods'
attorney did not draft the release, but Woods had "weeks" to consider the agreement before signing it.
Finally, Woods was not in jail when the agreement was offered, and the agreement, on its face,
indicated no ambiguity. Id.
In Hill v. City of Cleveland, the Sixth Circuit found the agreement to be voluntary. 12 F.3d at 578.
Hill, the criminal defendant, "lacked sophistication," but this factor was counterbalanced by his
experienced legal representation. Id. Second, Hill was not in jail when he signed the release. Third, Hill
had two months to consider the agreement. Fourth, the charges were minor, thereby making the
potential coercion relatively minimal. Fifth, the release was under judicial supervision. Id. These fourth
and fifth factors indicate that the Sixth Circuit relied on Justice O'Connor's Rumery concurrence and
her suggested additions to the voluntariness test. See Rumery, 480 U.S. at 401-03 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
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enhanced voluntariness test, the Third Circuit held that the prosecution in
Livingstone had not proven that the defendant voluntarily entered into her
release-dismissal agreement.7"
In Cain,72 the Third Circuit again addressed the issue of voluntariness,
but in terms of its importance relative to the other Rumery factors. The
Third Circuit held that proof of voluntariness alone is not sufficient to
establish the validity of a release-dismissal agreement." A prosecutor
must also demonstrate that the agreement served to further public policy
goals.74 The court explained that the settlement of a borderline civil case
would constitute a valid public policy goal.75 However, in Cain, the court
refused to uphold the agreement because the prosecutor failed to demon-
strate whether he had even inquired as to the merits of the criminal
defendant's civil suit.76
See also Vallone v. Lee, 7 F.3d 196, 198-99 (1Ilth Cir. 1993), in which the Eleventh Circuit applied
the Rumery test to a nontraditional release-dismissal agreement. In Vallone, the criminal defendant
signed an agreement whereby he "agreed" to release the sheriff from civil liability in exchange for
"good and valuable consideration" from the prosecutor. Id. at 198 n.2. The Eleventh Circuit found that
Vallone had been coerced into signing the agreement, because the sheriff threatened continued
imprisonment unless Vallone signed a waiver. Id. at 199. According to Vallone, the sheriff said, "Boy,
who do you think has the keys to this building?" Id. at 198. Additionally, the "good and valuable
consideration" promised was not dropped charges but mere release from jail. Telephone Interview with
Dennis J. Webb, counsel for Michael R. Vallone, Atlanta, Georgia (Feb. 3, 1994). Webb stated that only
release from incarceration, not dismissal of charges, was part of the terms of the agreement. Id. The
circumstances surrounding this agreement illustrate the stark contrast between the voluntary and
involuntary agreements. In particular, Vallone was in jail when he signed the agreement and the terms
of the release were extremely ambiguous. 7 F.3d at 198.
71. 12 F.3d at 1214. The court noted three factors affecting this determination: the ambiguous
wording of the agreement itself, the oral form of the agreement, and the ten-minute decisionmaking
time. Id.
72. Cain v. Darby Borough, 7 F.3d 377 (3d Cir. 1993).
73. Id. at 381. In Cain, the Third Circuit never addressed the voluntariness question because the
court invalidated the agreement on public policy grounds and did not need to continue its analysis any
further. See id. at 383; see also Coughlen v. Coots, 5 F.3d 970, 974 n.2 (6th Cir. 1993) (concluding that
under Rumery, "voluntariness alone is not sufficient to uphold [a release-dismissal] agreement").
74. Cain, 7 F.3d at 381.
75. Id. at 383.
76. Id. In Cain, the criminal defendant signed the release-dismissal agreement as a precondition
to admission into the state Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition (ARD) program. Id. at 379. ARD is
a tool used by prosecutors to place criminal defendants on probation instead of prosecuting them at trial.
Id. at 382. After successfully completing the rehabilitation program, criminal defendants obtain dismissal
of criminal charges against them. Id. The court criticized the prosecutor for requiring all ARD
candidates, not only Cain, to waive any civil claims they have against the police, municipality, or state.
Id. at 382-83. The court found the ARD program to be both underinclusive and overinclusive, because
it denied admission if the defendants did not waive their civil rights claim, and because it admitted
unqualified candidates if they signed a waiver of civil claims. Id. at 383. Furthermore, the prosecutor
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B. Relevant Public Policy Interests-The Sixth Circuit
Under a different set of circumstances from those confronted by the
Third Circuit, the Sixth Circuit found that a release-dismissal agreement did
serve certain public policy interests. In Hill v. City of Cleveland," the
Sixth Circuit concluded that the state articulated a valid public policy
interest in conserving valuable resources that would otherwise be used to
litigate a marginal civil claim. The police in Hill charged the defendant
with three criminal offenses.7" All of these alleged offenses were closely
tied to the civil claim in which the defendant denied any criminal
wrongdoing and further alleged that the police had used excess force
against him.79 The Sixth Circuit also noted in Hill that conflicting
accounts of the same altercation made it difficult to determine the truth of
the parties' respective claims.8" In light of this, the court reasoned that a
settlement agreement was appropriate.8" The state's motivation for
entering the agreement stemmed from the valid public policy interest of
conserving valuable litigation resources.
Release-dismissal agreements will further beneficial public policy goals
by saving enormous resources for the state, especially if many civil suits
are, like the one in Hill, of questionable merit.8 2 Even if only a few civil
sought admission for Cain because he fell into the domestic violence criminal category, which had a
high rate of frivolous cases. Id. The court criticized the prosecutor for not reviewing the individual
merits of Cain's case, and for relying solely on the statistical probability that Cain's case was frivolous.
Because the prosecutor failed to determine whether Cain's case was actually frivolous or marginal, the
court refused to uphold the agreement on public policy grounds. Id.
77. 12 F.3d 575 (6th Cir. 1993).
78. Id. at 577.
79. Id. at 576. Hill alleged that the police broke his elbow in three places. Id.
80. Id. at 579.
81. Intimating that Hill's civil tights action appeared to be of questionable merit, the court noted
that a release-dismissal agreement would "allow everyone to declare the case a draw and go home." Id.
(quoting Lynch, 880 F.2d at 1128 n.8).
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit upheld the validity of a release-dismissal agreement on the basis that
it is a public policy goal to settle "marginal" civil claims. Woods, 994 F.2d at 501 (citing Rumery, 480
U.S. at 395-96).
82. But see Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation,
72 CORNELL L. REv. 641 (1987). Eisenberg and Schwab point out that "Supreme Court Justices bemoan
the rise in [civil rights] filings and consequently restrict the remedies." Id. at 642. However, the authors
argue that the Court's approach stems from a misperception of civil tights litigation "based on a quick
citation to Administrative Office statistics." Id. at 643. Statistics maintained by the Administrative
Office may not categorize civil rights suits correctly. Therefore, the statistics mislead many into
believing that filings of all civil rights suits are dramatically rising when, in reality, the increase is
largely attributable to Title VII cases. Id. As a result, the statistics wrongly fuel the "perception of...
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suits lack true merit, the release-dismissal agreement still serves a useful
purpose in each individual case where the state avoids defending a marginal
or frivolous law suit.
The rationale used by the Sixth Circuit in Hill applies to yet another
public policy issue which the court did not explicitly address. The Rumery
dissent argued that release-dismissal agreements can be inherently coercive
for the criminal defendant because the agreements fail to achieve adequate-
ly the benefits of plea bargaining.
In his dissent in Rumery, Justice Stevens voiced concern over the
plurality opinion's analogy between plea bargaining agreements and
release-dismissal agreements. The terms of a plea bargain generally reflect
the strength or weakness of the impending criminal charges. The relative
bargaining positions of the prosecutor and the criminal defendant in a plea
bargaining situation are thought to be directly related to the defendant's
actual culpability.83 Justice Stevens specifically noted that, unlike plea
bargaining agreements, release-dismissal agreements can arise in situations
where there is little connection between the criminal charges and the civil
allegations.' Furthermore, Stevens argued that the potential lack of
connection between a civil claim and a criminal charge may force a
criminal defendant, unaware of the relative weaknesses of the prosecution's
case, to waive a strong civil claim.85
The Rumery dissent correctly identified a potential public policy problem
posed when release-dismissal agreements are used to settle unrelated civil
and criminal actions. In these situations, a prosecutor has incentive to trump
up weak criminal charges in order to achieve a favorable agreement for the
section 1983 cases flood[ing] the federal courts with questionable claims." Id. at 645. Eisenberg and
Schwab's analysis underscores the need to avoid sole reliance on any enormous anticipated savings that
release-dismissal agreements might bring. Rather, proponents of release-dismissal agreements should
focus on the benefit gained in each case in which an agreement is properly used.
83. See PETER W. Low & JOHN C. JEFFRiES, JR., CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS: SECTON 1983 AND
RELATED STATUTES 430 (1988). The authors describe the two parties in a plea bargaining negotiation
as "inversely related." Id. Both sides cannot claim to have a strong position because either the
prosecutor or defendant has a stronger case, leaving the other party in a weaker position. Id. See also
Bartholomy, supra note 23, at 351-52 ("[I]t is unlikely ... that the arrestee's threat of a civil suit is
as intimidating to the prosecutor as is the prosecutor's threat of indictment and trial.").
84. Rumery, 480 U.S. at 411. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
85. Justice Stevens argued that the agreement "exact[s] a price unrelated to the character of the
defendant's own conduct." Rumery, 480 U.S. at 411. Commentators have interpreted this statement to
mean that release-dismissal agreements, unlike plea bargains, do not reflect the relative strength of each
party's bargaining position. Low & JEFFRIEs, supra note 83, at 430. Indeed, when civil claims are
completely unrelated to the criminal charges facing a defendant, the defendant may be forced into
waiving what would be a strong civil claim. Id.
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state.86 The criminal defendant, on the other hand, may be coerced into
dropping legitimate civil claims. However, Justice Stevens' argument fails
to consider the viability of a release-dismissal agreement when the criminal
and civil actions are interrelated.
In Hill, the Sixth Circuit confronted a release-dismissal agreement in
which the civil and criminal charges were closely related. Although the Hill
court did not specifically analogize the agreement in that case to a plea
bargaining agreement, the case demonstrates that release-dismissal
agreements can reflect each party's relative bargaining position. 7 When
there is a close connection between the civil and the criminal claims, a
criminal defendant cannot be coerced into giving up an unrelated civil
claim, and the parties' relative bargaining positions are reflected in the
decision to enter the release-dismissal agreement.
Thus, in answer to the legitimate concerns that Justice Stevens voiced in
Rumery, courts should take the Sixth Circuit's rationale a step further.
Courts should prohibit release-dismissal agreements in situations where
there is no clear nexus between the impending criminal charges and the
potential civil claims.8 8 This prohibition will insure that release-dismissal
agreements retain the same noncoercive quality inherent in plea bargaining
86. Rumery, 480 U.S. at 412-13.
87. See Hill, 12 F.3d at 579. However, the release-dismissal agreement still differs from plea
bargaining because, with the former, there is no "inverse relationship" between the two parties in which
one party has a strong case and one party has a weak case. See supra note 83. Instead, both parties
appear to have weak cases. Nevertheless, when release-dismissal agreements involve closely tied
criminal and civil claims, the agreements achieve the same functional benefit as plea bargaining.
Defendants in these situations give up something related to their bargaining position.
For example, suppose a criminal defendant is charged with resisting arrest, but claims that the police
used excessive force. The close relationship between the two charges means that proving the criminal
charge would probably disprove the civil claim, and vice versa. However, as Hill demonstrates, both
parties often have a weak case, because it may be very difficult to determine which side is giving the
"true facts." 12 F.3d at 579. Therefore, by entering into the agreement and waiving all civil claims, the
criminal defendant simply admits his relatively weak position.
When civil and criminal claims are not closely related, however, criminal defendants asked to enter
release-dismissal agreements may be coerced into waiving civil claims that are independent of the
strength of the criminal charge against them. Thus, that these defendants waive civil claims does not
accurately reflect their relative bargaining positions. For example, suppose another criminal defendant
is charged with theft and claims that the police used excessive force by shooting him in the chest to
apprehend him. If the prosecutor offers to enter into a release-dismissal agreement, this criminal
defendant may be coerced into waiving a meritorious civil claim without knowing the prosecutor's
ability to succeed in pursuing a criminal conviction.
88. "Where there is not a substantial nexus between the criminal charge and the civil rights claim,
the prosecutor's uncertainty as to the merits of the criminal charge is a less compelling reason to require
dismissal of the civil rights claim." 12 F.3d at 579 (citing Lynch, 880 F.2d at 1128 n.8).
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agreements.
C. Prosecutorial Misconduct
In addition to addressing the issues of voluntariness and public policy
interests, the post-Rumery courts have also scrutinized the potential for
prosecutorial misconduct. The Rumery dissent contended that release-
dismissal agreements inevitably encourage prosecutorial misconduct. The
dissent presumed that prosecutors will enter into the agreements simply
because they lack probable cause to prosecute the criminal case.89
Furthermore, a prosecutor faces a potential conflict of interest when asked
to consider simultaneously the liability of the police department and the
strength of an unrelated criminal case. In fact, a prosecutor might drop a
criminal case, not because of the difficulty of bringing it to trial, but solely
to protect the police.
In Woods v. Rhodes,9" however, the Eighth Circuit concluded that
release-dismissal agreements are not always driven by these types of
illegitimate concerns. 9 The prosecutor in Woods wanted to settle criminal
charges out of court because prosecution of the case would have been
extremely costly.' The prosecutor needed to bring an out-of-state witness
back for trial, and would have needed to spend state resources to do so.93
The motivation to seek a release-dismissal agreement in Woods did not
stem from a lack of probable cause but, instead, from the difficulty and
expense of orchestrating a full criminal trial.94 Consequently, the Eighth
89. 480 U.S. at 413 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See supra note 57 for a discussion of relevant ethical
rules regarding probable cause.
90. 994 F.2d 494 (8th Cir. 1993).
91. Id. at 500.
92. Id. at 498.
93. Id. The prosecutor's critical witness was the arresting officer, who had moved to Alabama by
the time of the trial. Id. at 498 n.2. Therefore, the prosecutor would have needed to fly the officer from
Alabama to Sioux City, Iowa, the site of the arrest and trial. Id. at 498.
94. See 994 F.2d at 500-01. In discussions between the prosecutor and Woods' attorney, the
prosecutor declared his intention to bring the officer back to Iowa for trial. Id. at 499. In a letter,
Woods' attorney informed Woods that the prosecutor intended to do the following: "If no acceptance
[of the release-dismissal agreement] is made ... he intends to acquire the attendance of [the witness
and] ... will purchase an airline ticket for his flight." Id. Based on this evidence, the Eighth Circuit
found that the prosecutor would have prosecuted the case at trial. Id. at 501. Therefore, the decision to
enter into the agreement did not stem from lack of probable cause because it appears that the
prosecution would have been able to bring the critical witness back to trial.
The Ninth Circuit, in Lynch, 880 F.2d at 1128-29, also faced the issue of prosecutorial misconduct
due to lack of probable cause. The court pointed to the statements of several officers who characterized
the arrest of Lynch as "questionable." Id. As a result, the Ninth Circuit doubted that there was a "very
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Circuit noted that release-dismissal agreements may be the product of a
prosecutor's legitimate use of discretion in allocating state resources. 9"
III. EXPOSING THE PUBLIC TO RISK: SIGNIFICANT PUBLIC POLICY
CONCERNS UNRESOLVED BY JUDICIAL SOLUTIONS
Courts in the post-Rumery era have demonstrated an ability to preserve
the benefits of release-dismissal agreements for both the criminal defendant
and the government. However, the present judicial framework fails to
address two significant public policy concerns linked to a prosecutor's use
of release-dismissal agreements. These concerns involve: 1) a prosecutor's
ethical duty to seek justice for the public at large; and 2) the intended goals
strong factual basis for criminal charges." Id. Additionally, the court found a second possible type of
prosecutorial misconduct. The court pointed out that the prosecutor may have threatened prosecution
only after Lynch declared his intention to pursue civil litigation. Id. Based on the two possible acts of
misconduct, the Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to make findings on the issue of
public interest. Id.
In Hill, the Sixth Circuit found no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct. 12 F.3d at 579. In
particular, the court found no evidence that the prosecutor filed criminal charges in retaliation for Hill's
stated intention to pursue a civil suit. The police officer asserted that he filed criminal charges without
any knowledge of Hill's intention to sue the police. Because Hill did not refute the officer's statement,
the court found no evidence of prosecutorial misconduct. The court explicitly distinguished the case
from Lynch, where the court suspected misconduct. Id.
95. The Eighth Circuit listed the following legitimate prosecutorial reasons for entering a release-
dismissal agreement: "cost and burden of litigating law suits," efficient "docket control," and avoidance
of questionable civil rights claims. Woods, 994 F.2d at 500.
Furthermore, the Woods court outlined two factors which bear on a finding of prosecutorial
overreaching. First, the court considered the "nature of the criminal charges." Id. This reflects Justice
O'Connor's reasoning in Rumery that as criminal charges become more serious, the agreement is more
likely to be a product of coercion. See Rumery, 480 U.S. at 1196 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Secondly,
the Eighth Circuit considered the timing of the decision to prosecute. Specifically, the court asked
whether the prosecution's "threat" of charges came before or after the criminal defendant filed her civil
claims. Woods, 994 F.2d at 500-01. In Woods, the court found that the prosecutor originally filed
criminal charges before Woods threatened a civil suit. Id. Therefore, the court determined that the
prosecutor did not bring criminal charges in retaliation for Woods' decision to file civil claims. Id. The
court stated: "What Woods perceives as the 'threat' of prosecution was actually nothing more than the
likelihood.., that their charges will be advanced to their ultimate conclusion." Id. See supra note 94
for further analysis of the facts of Woods and a comparison with Lynch.
Although the need to avoid questionable civil rights claims and the nature of the criminal suit are
both factors related to the question of prosecutorial misconduct, the test for prosecutorial misconduct
often overlaps with concerns regarding voluntariness and public policy. For example, in Rumery, the
plurality listed the settlement of "marginal" claims as an indication of beneficial public policy goals.
480 U.S. at 395. Also, in Justice O'Connor's concurrence, she listed seriousness of charges as part of
the voluntariness test. Id. at 401 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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of the Civil Rights Act, particularly 42 U.S.C. § 1983.96
A. Violation of a Prosecutor's Ethical Duty
By entering into a release-dismissal agreement, a prosecutor fails to put
the public on notice of possible misconduct and, consequently, violates his
or her ethical duty to seek justice for the public. The ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (Model Rules),97 the ABA Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility (Model Code),9" and the ABA Standards for
Criminal Justice (ABA Standards)99 all define the prosecutor's ethical
obligations. Model Rule 3.8 focuses on the prosecutor's obligations to act
fairly towards an individual criminal defendant."°° However, comment 1
to Model Rule 3.8 indicates that the prosecutor also has a duty to act as a
96. There may also be a third concern: criminal defendants might bring meritless suits in order
to bargain for release-dismissal agreements. Under this scenario, a criminal defendant could then waive
a meritless civil claim in exchange for a release of any criminal charges. However, civil rights plaintiffs
in § 1983 suits have difficulty in establishing a prima facie case because police officers hold qualified
immunity. The United States Supreme Court, in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), stated that
officers are generally "shielded from liability for civil damages... [as long as] their conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known." Id. at 818. Because of a police officer's qualified immunity, a criminal defendant would have
difficulty coercing the prosecution to drop criminal charges in exchange for the waiver of an obviously
meritless civil claim. Prosecutors would undoubtedly realize that defendants could not prevail in such
cases. Therefore, the tough standard of proof would make it difficult for criminal defendants to initiate
a "strike suit."
97. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCT (1992) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]. The Model
Rules were the culmination of four major drafts created by the ABA-appointed Kutak Commission. See
STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, JR., REGULATION OF LAwyERs: STATurEs AND STANDARDs 3
(1993). The ABA House of Delegates adopted the rules in 1983. Id. Gillers and Simon estimate that,
since 1983, about 36 states have adopted the Model Rules in some form. Id.
98. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESpoNsimrrY (1983) [hereinafter MODEL CODE]. In 1969,
the ABA House of Delegates approved the Model Code to replace the ABA Canons of Professional
Ethics. GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 97, at 319. By 1980, virtually every state had adopted a form of
the Model Code. Id. However, since the adoption of the Model Rules, Gillers and Simon estimate that
fewer than 15 states continue to use the Model Code. Id.
99. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1992) [hereinafter ABA STANDARDS]. The ABA
Standards were first published as a full collection in 1980. GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 97, at 407.
Over 40 states have amended their criminal codes to include the ABA Standards. Id.
100. MODEL RULES Rule 3.8 (1992). The rule requires that a prosecutor "shall (a) refrain from
prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause; ... [and] (d) make
timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the prosecutor that tends to
negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense ... ." Id. (emphasis added). The rule does not
address the prosecutor's duties to the public in general, but focuses only on conduct toward the
defendant.
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"minister of justice...... The Model Code imposes a similar public duty
upon a prosecutor.02 Therefore, in addition to duties owed to any
individual defendant, a prosecutor bears a broad responsibility to seek
justice for the community as a whole.
In the context of release-dismissal agreements, a prosecutor could
ordinarily argue that the public is well served by the disposition of
101. MODEL RuLEs Rule 3.8 cmt. 1 (1992). The comment states: "A prosecutor has the
responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate.' Id.
102. Disciplinary Rules (DR) 7-103 of the Model Code contains language similar to that found in
Rule 3.8 of the Model Rules. DR 7-103 states:
(A) A public prosecutor or other government lawyer shall not institute or cause to be
instituted criminal charges when he knows or it is obvious that the charges are not supported
by probable cause.
(B) A public prosecutor or other government lawyer in criminal litigation shall make timely
disclosure to counsel for the defendant,or to the defendant if he has no counsel, of the
existence of evidence, known to the prosecutor or other government lawyer, that tends to
negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the degree of the offense, or reduce the punishment.
MODEL CODE DR 7-103 (1983).
The Disciplinary Rule only refers to a prosecutor's duty towards an individual criminal defendant.
However, as in the Model Rules, the comments to DR 7-103 explain the prosecutor's broad duty to act
in the public's best interest. Ethical Consideration (EC) 7-13 notes that a prosecutor's role is to "seek
justice." MODEL CODE EC 7-13 (1983). EC 7-13 states:
The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advocate; his duty is
to seek justice, not merely to convict. This special duty exists because: (1) the prosecutor
represents the sovereign and therefore should use restraint in the discretionary exercise of
governmental powers .... [and] (2) during trial the prosecutor is not only an advocate but he
also may make decisions normally made by an individual client, and those affecting the public
interest should be fair to all ....
Id.
Additionally, the drafters of EC 7-13 quoted an excerpt from Professional Responsibility: Report
of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1218 (1958), which states in part:
The public prosecutor must recall that he occupies a dual role, being obligated, on the one
hand, to furnish that adversarial element essential to the informed decision of any controversy,
but being possessed, on the other, of important governmental powers that are pledged to the
accomplishment of one objective only, that of impartial justice. When the prosecutor is
recreant to the trust implicit in his office, he undermines confidence, not only in his
profession, but in government and the very ideal of justice itself.
Id. at 1218 n.24.
Moreover, EC 7-14 states:
A governmental lawyer who has discretionary power relative to litigation should refrain from
instituting or continuing litigation that is obviously unfair .... A government lawyer in a
civil action or administrative proceeding has the responsibility to seek justice and develop a
full and fair record, and he should not use his position or the economic power of the
government to harass parties or to bring about unjust settlements or results.
MODEL CODE EC 7-14 (1983).
Therefore, a prosecutor who enters into a release-dismissal agreement could arguably be bringing
about an "unjust settlement or result" because the public never receives notice of police misconduct.
In the absence of any impartial review of police misconduct, prosecutors violate their ethical duty under
the Model Code.
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marginal claims against a criminal defendant. However, in some situations,
a prosecutor might use the agreement to bury meritorious civil claims.
Under this scenario, the prosecutor's actions prevent the public from
receiving notice of police misconduct. Thus, the prosecutor fails to uphold
his or her general obligation to the public.
In addition to implementing the Model Rules and the Model Code,
several jurisdictions have enacted rules patterned after the ABA Standards
for Criminal Justice. 3 In contrast to the Model Rules and Model Code,
the ABA Standards list a prosecutor's duties to the public in the text of the
rule rather than in the comment section." 4 Therefore, the ABA Standards
arguably create a more explicit duty on prosecutors to act in the best
interests of the public. For instance, Standard 3-1.2 describes a prosecutor
as an "administrator of justice" whose role is "to seek justice, not merely
to convict."1 °5 The ABA Standards also require a higher standard of
conduct by prosecutors than the Model Rules or the Model Code, because
the ABA standards place on prosecutors an affirmative duty "to seek to
reform and improve the administration of criminal justice.!"t0 In certain
situations, a prosecutor might argue that release-dismissal agreements
"improve" the workings of the justice system by resolving civil suits of
questionable merit and by allowing the state to direct valuable time and
resources to serious criminal cases. However, when prosecutors use the
agreement to bury meritorious civil claims and the flawed agreement is not
challenged in court, the prosecutor breaches an ethical obligation to the
general public. Despite the gain in efficiency in the criminal justice system,
the public loses when it is not made aware of police misconduct.
These ethical considerations received no attention in Rumery and
subsequent cases. Even Justice Stevens, in his Rumery dissent, focused on
the duty to prosecute crimes rather than the duty to make the public aware
of police misconduct."0 7 The dissent did not refer to any ethical rules in
103. See supra note 99.
104. ABA STANDAms Standard 3-1.2 (1992).
105. Id. Standard 3-1.2 (b) and (c) provide: "(b) The prosecutor is an administrator of justice, an
advocate, and an officer of the court; the prosecutor must exercise sound discretion in the performance
of his or her functions. (c) The duty of the prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict." Id.
106. ABA STANDARDs Standard 3-1.2 (d) (1992). Standard 3-1.2 (d) provides: "it is an important
function of the prosecutor to seek to reform and improve the administration of criminal justice. When
inadequacies or injustices in the substantive or procedural law come to the prosecutor's attention, he
or she should stimulate efforts for remedial action." Id.
107. Rumery, 480 U.S. at 412-13 (Stevens, J., dissenting). But see supra note 57 for relevant
portions of ethical rules which Justice Stevens cited as creating a prosecutor's duty toward an individual
defendant.
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its discussion of the public's right to receive notice. While release-dismissal
agreements may accomplish many worthy goals, courts continue to ignore
that, in some situations, the agreements are the product of a prosecutor's
breach of ethical obligations to the public.
B. Conflict with the Purposes of§ 1983
Release-dismissal agreements may also conflict with the policies
underlying 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The United States Supreme Court has
emphasized individual remedy as the primary purpose of § 1983; however,
the Court has also suggested that § 1983 encompasses broader public
concerns, including notification of police misconduct and deterrence of
future misbehavior.'0 8
In 1961, in Monroe v. Pape,"° the Supreme Court examined the
legislative history and purpose of § 1983.' Justice Douglas, delivering
the opinion of the Court, acknowledged that the Civil Rights Act was
passed in response to the unchecked lawlessness perpetrated by the Ku
Klux Klan."' However, Douglas also noted that the Act does not directly
target the Klan; instead, it provides a remedy against state officials who fail
to enforce state laws that would otherwise curb miscreants such as the
Klan."' Exploring the legislative history, Justice Douglas pointed out that
Congress intended § 1983 to provide a federal remedy to individuals whose
civil rights were abridged by persons acting "under color" of state
authority."13
108. See infra notes 118-25 and accompanying text.
109. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled by Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658
(1978).
110. 365 U.S. at 170-92. The court noted that Congress originally enacted § 1983 as section 1 of
the Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20, 1871. 365 U.S. at 171.
111. Id. at 172-76.
112. Id. at 175-76. Justice Douglas stated: "While one main scourge of the evil--perhaps the
leading one-was the Ku Klux Klan, the remedy created was not a remedy against it... but against
those who representing a State in some capacity were unable or unwilling to enforce a state law." Id.
113. 365 U.S. at 180. In support of his view, Douglas cited statements made during the
congressional debates which stressed the need to provide a federal remedy to individual victims,
regardless of any existing state remedy. Justice Douglas argued that § 1983 originally performed three
functions: "overrid[ing] certain kinds of state laws"; "provid[ing] a remedy where state law was
inadequate"; and "provid[ing] a federal remedy where the state remedy ... was not available in
practice." Id. at 173-74. In support of these three views, Douglas cited the legislative history of§ 1983.
Id. at 173-75.
Regarding the first purpose, overriding state laws, Justice Douglas cited the statements of Mr. Sloss
of Alabama, who spoke in opposition. Id. at 173. Sloss stated:
The first section of this bill prohibits any invidious legislation by States against the rights or
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Although the Monroe Court refused to extend § 1983 liability to
municipalities, 114 in 1978 the Court made this extension in Monell v.
Department of Social Services.115 However, like the Monroe Court, the
privileges of citizens of the United States. The object of this section is not very clear, as it
is not pretended by its advocates on this floor that any State has passed any laws endangering
the rights or privileges of the colored people.
Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., Ist Sess. App. 268 (1871)).
Regarding the second purpose, to provide a remedy where state law was inadequate, Justice Douglas
cited the statements of Senator Sherman of Ohio. 365 U.S. at 173-74. Senator Sherman stated:
[I]t is said the reason is that any offense may be committed upon a negro by a white man,
and a negro cannot testify in any case against a white man, so that the only way by which
any conviction can be had in Kentucky in those cases is in the United States courts, because
the United States courts enforce the United States laws by which negroes may testify.
Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., Ist Sess. 345 (1871)).
Finally, Justice Douglas cited the statements of Mr. Lowe of Kansas to explain the third purpose of
§ 1983, to provide a federal remedy even when a state remedy exists. 365 U.S. at 174-75. Lowe stated:
While murder is stalking abroad in disguise, while whippings and lynchings and banishment
have been visited upon unoffending American citizens, the local administrations have been
found inadequate or unwilling to apply the proper corrective. Combinations, darker than the
night that hides them, conspiracies, wicked as the worst of felons could devise, have gone
unwhipped of justice. Immunity is given to crime, and the records of the public tribunals are
searched in vain for any evidence of effective redress.
Id. (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sass. App. 166-67 (1871)).
114. 365 U.S. at 191-92. The Court held that a municipality did not constitute a "person" who could
be held liable under § 1983. Id. See supra note 6 for the relevant portion of § 1983. Justice Douglas
pointed to a failed amendment proposed by Senator Sherman which he claimed would have included
municipalities as parties liable under § 1983. 365 U.S. at 188. Because Congress rejected the
amendment, Douglas argued that Congress could not have construed municipalities as persons for
purposes of the statute. Id.
Although Justice Douglas refused to extend the scope of§ 1983 liability, he did make the standard
of proof less stringent by not requiring a plaintiff to prove specific intent. Id. at 187. Commentators
have agreed that Monroe sparked growth of § 1983 litigation by relaxing the standard of proof. See
Low & JEFFRIES, supra note 83, at 12; Robert H. Freilich et al., 1978-79 Annual Review of Local
Government Law: Undermining Municipal and State Initiative in an Era of Crisis and Uncertainty, In
SEcTION 1983: SwoRD AND SHIELD 47 (Robert H. Freilich & Richard G. Carlisle eds., 1983) (observing
that Monroe "marked the beginning of modem Section 1983 litigation"); H.E. BARRINEU, III, CIVIL
LAB[Lrry IN CRImINAL JuSTICE 11 (1987) ("After ninety years of relative inactivity, Section 1983 was
resuscitated by the United States Supreme Court in 1961, and the seed for future fruition was sown.").
115. 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978). Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, disagreed with Douglas'
analysis of the Sherman amendment. Brennan argued that "nothing in the debates on the Sherman
amendment" would have precluded a court from holding municipalities liable. Id. at 683. Justice
Brennan cited legislative history to support his view that several congressmen assumed municipalities
would be included under § 1983. Id. at 683-87. Also, Brennan analogized municipalities to corporations,
which had already been treated by courts as "persons." Id. at 687-88. However, nowhere in Monell did
Justice Brennan dispute the Monroe Court's analysis of the legislative history and purpose of § 1983,
with the exception of its analysis regarding the liability of municipalities.
The Monell Court did set limits on municipal liability, by requiring plaintiffs to prove action in
conformity with "official [municipal] policy and rejecting respondeat superior liability." Id. at 594.
Despite these limits, Monell, like Monroe, expanded the scope of § 1983 liability. See Freilich et al.,
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Monell Court focused on an individual's rights under § 1983.16 Neither
the Monroe nor the Monell Court explicitly recognized that § 1983 was
designed to provide public benefits, such as public notice of misconduct or
deterrence of future misconduct.'1
7
Despite the Supreme Court's focus on the individual's right to obtain a
remedy for state misconduct under § 1983, the Court has identified
secondary purposes of § 1983 that benefit the public. City of Riverside v.
Rivera18 involved a controversy regarding the amount of attorney's fees
owed to a victorious § 1983 plaintiff. 9 The Court concluded that
Congress, by providing attorney's fees in 42 U.S.C. § 1988120 to victori-
ous civil rights plaintiffs, recognized that civil rights actions serve the
public interest.' Writing for the majority in City of Riverside, Justice
Brennan reasoned that a civil rights plaintiff acts as a "private attorney
general" and should be rewarded with attorney's fees for acting on behalf
of the public in exposing misconduct."m Brennan cited the legislative
history of § 1988 to bolster his rationale.1 ' The City of Riverside
supra note 114, at 63 ("[The Court in Monell] embarked on a new trail into the heretofore forbidden
realm of municipality liability for the deprivation of constitutional rights of individuals."); BARRnEAU,
supra note 114, at 14 ("As a result of this ruling, all Section 1983 plaintiffs had a deeper pocket into
which they could reach .... ).
116. 436 U.S. at 694.
117. In fact, in 1978, the same year that Monell was decided, the Court held that the "basic
purpose" of§ 1983 is to provide a private remedy for individual victims. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S.
247, 254 (1978).
118. 477 U.S. 561 (1986).
119. Id. at 564-67.
120. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) provides in part: "In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of
sections 1981, 1981a, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this tile .... the court, in its discretion, may
allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs."
42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
121. 477 U.S. at 575-76.
122. Id. at 575. "Congress expressly recognized that a plaintiff who obtains relief in a civil rights
lawsuit 'does so not for himself alone but also as a private attorney general' vindicating a policy that
Congress considered of the highest importance." Id. (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.,
390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968) (addressing a claim under the Civil Rights Act of 1964)). See also Hensley
v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 444 n.4 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). In
Hensley, Brennan reasoned that "the public as a whole has an interest in the vindication of the rights
conferred by the statutes enumerated in § 1988, over and above the value of a civil rights remedy to
a particular plaintiff." Id.
123. City of Riverside, 477 U.S. at 575-77. Justice Brennan used the legislative history not only to
illustrate the purpose of § 1988, but also to point out the purposes of civil rights laws in general. Id.
For example, Brennan quoted the remarks of Senator Tunney, who stated: "If the citizen does not have
the resources, his day in court is denied him; the congressional policy which he seeks to assert and
vindicate goes unvindicated; and the entire Nation, not just the individual citizen suffers." Id. at 575
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decision and § 1988 suggest that civil rights plaintiffs do not act as
ordinary civil litigants, but deserve special recognition and compensation
for their public service.
The notion of civil rights plaintiffs as "private attorneys general" implies
that § 1983, like other civil right laws, serves broader goals apart from
simply providing a remedy for individual victims. First, civil rights
plaintiffs, as private attorneys general, expose misconduct on behalf of the
public. 24 Second, as the Court noted in City of Riverside, damages
awarded to civil rights plaintiffs provide a substantial deterrent against
future misconduct."z Release-dismissal agreements would suppress these
two secondary public policy goals.
IV. ESTABLISHMENT OF CIVILIAN OVERSIGHT COMMITTEES
The current judicial framework for determining the validity of release-
dismissal agreements preserves the criminal defendant's rights and the
state's interests, but remains inherently flawed because courts ignore
problems that have a significant impact on the public interest. Release-
dismissal agreements cause ethical dilemmas for prosecutors and frustrate
achievement of the purposes of § 1983 to notify the public of misconduct
and deter future misconduct. Nevertheless, release-dismissal agreements
allow a state to conserve critical resources that would otherwise be used to
(quoting 122 CONG. REC. 33313 (1976)). Justice Brennan also noted the remarks of Senator Hathaway,
who stated: "[R]ight now the vindication of important congressional policies in the vital area of civil
rights is made to depend upon the financial resources of those least able to promote them." 477 U.S.
at 577 (quoting 122 CONG. REC. 31832 (1976)). These two statements indicate that civil rights plaintiffs,
including § 1983 plaintiffs, are not ordinary litigants, but act on behalf of the public. Awarding attorney
fees is one way to compensate them for their efforts.
In addition to the excerpts cited by Justice Brennan, the Senate Report accompanying § 1988
provides more insights into the purpose of§ 1988 and the purposes of civil rights laws in general. For
example, the Senate Report noted that the purpose of § 1988 was to "remedy anomalous gaps in our
civil rights laws created by [previous Supreme Court cases]." S. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
1 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5908, 5909. The Senate Report described the "anomalous
gaps" as allowing attorney's fees awards in some civil rights cases, while denying them in others. Id.
at 4, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5911. In response, the Senate Report advocated awarding
attorney's fees in all civil rights cases. Id. Additionally, the Senate Report noted that civil rights
plaintiffs act as "private attorneys general." Id. at 3, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5910. Therefore,
the legislative history of§ 1988 indicates that all civil rights plaintiffs, including § 1983 plaintiffs, are
to be regarded as "private attorneys general," pursuing litigation on behalf of the public interest. Section
1988 attorney fees are awarded in recognition of these actions on behalf of the public.
124. Id. at 3, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5910.
125. City of Riverside, 477 U.S. at 575 (citing McCann v. Coughlin, 698 F.2d 112, 129 (2d Cir.
1983)).
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defend against marginal civil claims. For these reasons, state legislatures
must establish a means by which the state and the defendant can continue
to reap the benefits of release-dismissal agreements without subjecting the
public to the accompanying risks.
Rather than abandoning release-dismissal agreements, state legislatures
should establish civilian oversight committees to review police conduct in
cases in which these agreements have been used.126 Civilian oversight
committees constitute a measure necessary to correct the flaws inherent in
judicial solutions. In the absence of such committees, courts should not
enforce release-dismissal agreements, because the agreements would
continue to harm the public by obstructing public notification and
deterrence of police misconduct.
Civilian oversight committees are by no means untried experiments.
Jurisdictions across the country have used civilian oversight committees as
an alternative to internal affairs departments for investigating police
misconduct. 27 The New York Civil Liberties Union (NYCLU), in a
report on civilian review, scrutinized the strengths and weaknesses of
civilian oversight committees in seven cities"2 and recommended some
general guidelines that legislatures should follow when creating a model
civilian committee. 129 First, the committee should be independent of the
police department, and consist of an all-civilian staff.13 Independent
126. Several prosecutors' offices do not even use release-dismissal agreements. See Seth F. Kreimer,
Releases, Redress, and Police Misconduct: Reflections on Agreements to Waive Civil Rights Actions in
Exchange for Dismissal of Criminal Charges, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 851, 864 tbl. I (1988). Nine areas
do not use release-dismissal agreements as a matter of internal policy: Arizona State Attorney General;
Cook County, Illinois; Lake County, Illinois; Denver, Colorado; Montgomery County, Maryland; Palm
Beach, Florida; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Seattle, Washington; and Suffolk County, Massachusetts.
Id. Additionally, the Denver City Attorney and the Monroe County, New York, District Attorney are
prohibited by court rulings from entering into these agreements. Id. Finally, in Maricopa County,
Arizona, and San Francisco, California, the agreements are not used as a matter of custom. Id. Based
on his research, Kreimer concluded that the release-dismissal agreement was "[flar from being a
standard tool for advancing 'legitimate prosecutorial interests."' Id. at 865. Of course, in those
jurisdictions where release-dismissal agreements are not used, citizens' committees like those proposed
in this Note would not be necessary.
127. See Alison L. Patton, Note, The Endless Cycle ofAbuse: Why 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Is Ineffective
in Deterring Police Brutality, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 753,794 (1993) (reporting that thirty of the fifty largest
cities in the United States use civilian oversight committees); see also NEW YORK CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION, CILIAN REvIEw OF POLIcrNG: A CASE STUDY REPORT 3 (1992) [hereinafter NYCLU REPORT]
(noting that eighteen civilian oversight committees were established during the two and one-half years
preceding the NYCLU case study).
128. NYCLU REPORT, supra note 127, at 2.
129. Id. at 126.
130. Id.
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committees remain free from police department domination and cultivate
public confidence.' 3' Second, in the committee's charter, the state
legislature should expressly grant subpoena power to compel testimony and
information from police officers and police department heads.' This
clear delegation of subpoena power would curb police resistance.'
In addition to the NYCLU's recommendations, state legislatures should
require civilian oversight committees to conduct public hearings. Public
hearings would notify the public of police misconduct in specific cases and
could also reveal a pattern of department-wide misconduct. Without public
hearings, the committees would resemble internal affairs departments,
131. The NYCLU discussed the difficulties that arise when civilian committees are not wholly
independent from police departments. Id. at 42. For instance, the Chicago Police Department established
the Office of Professional Standards (OPS) as a "civilian" review board. Id. However, the police
department staffed the OPS with police officers' relatives. Id. The committee's lack of independence
created distrust from the minority community and led the Chicago Crime Commission (a transition team
for the incoming mayor) to characterize the OPS as "nothing more than an extension of the police
department... totally lack[ing] credibility in both the black and white communities." Id.
Notwithstanding these criticisms, Chicago's civilian review board sustained (i.e., did not dismiss for
lack of evidence) a greater percentage of excessive force complaints than the police department's
internal review board. NYCLU REPORT, supra note 127, at 17. The OPS sustained 10.1% of excessive
force complaints in its first year of operation, compared to the police department's rate of 1.4%. Id.
However, the presence of police officers' relatives on the OPS board indicated that there is potential
for police department domination of the OPS. Whenever a civilian committee, like the OPS, is created
by a police department, even if not officially run by the department, the potential exists for police
domination. Therefore, state legislatures would better serve the public and instill needed public
confidence by creating independent committees with no ties to police departments.
Independent civilian committees also operate more effectively than the internal affairs division of
police departments. The independent civilian committee in Berkeley, California, sustained 70% of its
cases in the first year of operation. NYCLU REPORT, supra note 127, at 16. A year earlier, the police
department had sustained only 4% of the cases filed. Id. Minneapolis' independent review board
sustained 8 out of 26 cases in its first 21 months of operation, compared to the 17 total cases sustained
by the city's police department in the previous 15 years. Id. at 17. The large increase in sustained cases
tends to prove that independent committees hold police officers to a "higher standard of conduct." Id.
at 16. Also, statistical comparison suggests that internal affairs departments are more sympathetic to
police officers, and thus less vigilant in identifying misconduct. Independent committees, on the other
hand, are not as susceptible to police department domination.
132. NYCLU REPORT, supra note 127, at 126.
133. Id. at 89. The NYCLU pointed to Cincinnati as an example of initial police resistance to
civilian committees. Id. The Office of Municipal Investigation (OMI), Cincinnati's civilian review
board, lacked any express authority to serve subpoenas, but nevertheless tried to subpoena police
testimony and records. The police department ignored subpoenas and refused to answer questions on
grounds of self-incrimination. Finally, the city amended the ordinance that created the committee to
expressly provide the OMI with subpoena power over police testimony and records. This amendment
forced the police to cooperate. Id.
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which do not reveal their findings to the public.'34 Finally, state legisla-
tures should empower the committees to make binding recommendations
for appropriate sanctions against offending officers. Although such a
provision may engender police hostility, nonbinding recommendations give
police incentive to ignore the committee.
The four proposed elements of independence, subpoena power, public
hearings, and binding recommendations would make the civilian oversight
committee an effective vehicle to curb misconduct. Prosecutors could
justify use of a release-dismissal agreement without risking an ethical
violation.'35 With an effective oversight committee in place, a prosecutor
can arrange a release-dismissal agreement without concern that the alleged
misconduct will be kept from the public eye. Claims of questionable merit
can be settled while, at the same time, an impartial body determines
whether there was actual misconduct. An effective oversight program is
also consistent with the purposes of § 1983. Civilian committees accom-
plish the goals of public notice and deterrence of misconduct regardless of
a defendant's motivation for entering the agreement.
Civilian oversight committees, nevertheless, do raise some policy
concerns that states should consider. For instance, an overzealous
committee's scrutiny might become so burdensome that some states simply
would not use release-dismissal agreements. However, this scenario is
unlikely to occur because prosecutors generally do not use release-dismissal
134. Although the NYCLU did not specifically recommend public hearings, it did point out that
the city of Berkeley, California, currently includes public hearings as part of its civilian committee's
procedures. NYCLU REPORT, supra note 127, at 116. Berkeley's Police Review Commission conducts
its affairs through public hearings, while the police internal affairs division conducts closed hearings.
Id. State legislatures should follow Berkeley's example because public hearings promote public notice
of police misconduct. Without public hearings, a civilian oversight committee would not remedy the
central flaw of release-dismissal agreements: the failure to give public notice. Even though the
committee could serve as a deterrent to future misconduct, it would still fail to provide the public with
necessary information.
By contrast, Minneapolis' civilian oversight committee operates under closed hearings. However,
the committee plans to challenge the Minnesota law that currently requires closed hearings. Id. at 11.
135. See Bartholomy, supra note 23, at 363. The Colorado Bar Association has already prohibited
prosecutors from using release-dismissal agreements. Id. "li]t is improper for a public prosecutor to
require that a defendant, as a condition of charging or sentencing concessions, release governmental
agencies or their agents from actual or potential civil claims which arise from the same transactions as
the criminal episode." Colorado Bar Ass'n., Ethics Op. 62 (1982), cited in Bartholomy, supra note 23,
at 363.
Bartholomy argues that ethics laws similar to Colorado's would be the ideal solution to the problems
associated with release-dismissal agreements. Bartholomy, supra note 23, at 363. However, this Note
argues that civilian oversight committees are a more effective solution.
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agreements to avoid scrutiny but rather to save resources that would
otherwise be used to defend against marginal civil litigation. Although the
state would be burdened by increased scrutiny, it would continue to save
considerable resources. Therefore, oversight committees would not
eliminate the state's incentive to enter into release-dismissal agreements.
Oversight programs also create apprehension that police departments
would pressure prosecutors to stop using release-dismissal agreements
because the agreements invoke unwanted scrutinization of police affairs.
However, police departments should recognize that civilian review is a
more desirable alternative than civil suits. The Rodney King incident in Los
Angeles demonstrated that civil suits can result in a public relations disaster
for a police department.'36 A release-dismissal agreement, while still
exposing the department to civilian review, is arguably less likely to cause
high levels of negative media exposure and public backlash against the
police department than a civil trial. Therefore, police departments have a
greater incentive to use release-dismissal agreements than to accept the
burdens of civil suits.
Another policy concern involves whether police union rules would
require states to supply legal counsel during civilian oversight committee
hearings.'37 A state may forfeit some of the savings gained through the
use of release-dismissal agreements if it were forced to provide legal
counsel for all committee hearings. However, state legislatures could
alleviate this problem by setting guidelines to ensure that oversight
committees make timely recommendations. The committees could resolve
cases more quickly than the backlogged court system, and states would
ultimately spend less money on legal fees. Also, committees created
specifically to scrutinize release-dismissal agreements would gain specific
expertise in deciding these types of cases. This experience may serve to
expedite the process. 3
136. For a description of the Rodney King incident, see United States v. Koon, 833 F. Supp. 769
(C.D. Cal. 1993), aff'd in part and vacated in part, 34 F.3d 1416 (9th Cir. 1994). Alleging civil rights
violations, King sued the City of Los Angeles and the police officers involved in the incident. See
Christine Spolar, Officers in King Case Escape Damages, WASH. POST, June 2, 1994, at A5; William
Hamilton, King is Awarded $3.8 Million in Los Angeles Police Beating, WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 1994,
at Al.
137. Jurisdictions such as Berkeley, California, already require legal representation for police
officers during committee proceedings. NYCLU REPORT, supra note 127, at 114.
138. Civilian oversight committees may also create a third concern. A criminal defendant who
enters into an agreement might later be reluctant to testify against the police officer before a citizens'
oversight committee. State legislatures can respond to this problem by subpoenaing the testimony of
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V. CONCLUSION
Despite their potential problems, civilian oversight committees present
the most viable solution to problems with release-dismissal agreements left
unresolved by judicial decisions. Although judicial solutions adequately
protect the criminal defendant from coercive agreements and preserve the
state's interests in resolving unmeritorious claims, courts have neglected
important ethical and public policy concerns raised by release-dismissal
agreements. Civilian oversight committees would correct the flaws in
release-dismissal agreements by providing a means to accomplish public
notice and deter police misconduct. Moreover, these committees preserve
the state's incentives to use the agreements to save valuable resources that
might otherwise be used to defend borderline civil cases. Because
committees merely correct the remaining flaws of the release-dismissal
agreement, the committees complement rather than inhibit the use of
release-dismissal agreements. With the oversight committees in place,
release-dismissal agreements can be an effective tool for improving the law
enforcement process.
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